

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 AEC-11 AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00 DODE-00

EA-11 EUR-25 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 IO-13 L-03 NASA-04

NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-10 OIC-04 PA-03 PRS-01 RSC-01

SCI-06 SS-15 MBFR-03 USIA-15 SAJ-01 RSR-01 /203 W

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1084

INFO USMISSION NATO

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DISTO

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM-SW

SUBJ: CCD: SWEDISH INTERVENTION IN CCD ON "MINI-NUKES"

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THAT PORTION OF THE STATEMENT
MADE BY AMB MYRDAL (SWEDEN) IN THE 620TH PLENARY
SESSION OF THE CCD, AUGUST 9, ON "MINI-NUKES".

BEGIN TEXT EXCERPT

AS WE ARE ALL MEMBERS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WE
SHOULD ALSO WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY IT OFFERS TO PURSUE
FURTHER THE MATTER OF RESTRICTIONS IN, OR OUTRIGHT
PROHIBITIONS OF, THE USE OF CERTAIN WEAPONS AND METHODS
OF WARFARE. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE PRESENT PREOCCUPATION
STEMS FROM IMPRESSIONS GAINED OF THE CRUELTY OR
INDISCRIMINATE NATURE OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS IN RECENT
CONFLICTS, WE NEED NOT DWELL ON INCRIMINATIONS AS TO WHAT
IS BEHIND US. THE EFFORTS NOW NEEDED ARE FORWARD-LOOKING:
THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL CONCERNING CHEMICAL AND
BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WAS NOT THERE TO PREVENT SUFFERING
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IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR, BUT HELPED TO PREVENT THE USE OF

THESE WEAPONS IN THE SECOND.

THE OMINOUS MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS WHICH I HAVE ILLUSTRATED TODAY, THREATEN THE VIABILITY OF SOME DISARMAMENT TREATIES ALREADY ENTERED INTO. I WANT TO TOUCH TODAY PARTICULARLY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AS THERE ARE SIGNS OF DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MIGHT AFFECT THE WILLINGNESS TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE TREATY OFTEN REGARDED AS THE MAIN BULWARK IN THE PRIORITY FIELD OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.

SINCE THE VERY ACCEPTANCE OF NPT THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION THAT IT WAS NOT LIKELY TO SURVIVE BECAUSE OF ITS INHERENTLY DISCRIMINATORY NATURE, IF THE SUPERPOWERS DID NOT TAKE "EFFECTIVE MEASURES RELATING TO CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AT AN EARLY DATE." THE SALT AGREEMENTS REACHED IN MOSCOW LAST YEAR AND THE INTENTIONS EXPRESSED IN WASHINGTON THIS YEAR HAVE RIGHTLY BEEN HAILED AS PROMISING STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. SIMULTANEOUSLY, HOWEVER, DEVELOPMENTS SEEM TO BE UNDER WAY, THREATENING TO RENDER THE NPT EVEN MORE DISCRIMINATORY IN DIS-FAVOUR OF THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. I AM REFERRING TO NEWS ITEMS THAT THE MAJOR NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES ARE ABOUT TO LAUNCH A NEW GENERATION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, THE SO-CALLED MINI-NUKES. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD DRASTICALLY AGGRAVATE THE NUCLEAR THREAT AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES EVERYWHERE.

THERE HAS FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS BEEN A COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT THE EFFECTS OF A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BE SUCH THAT NO ONE COULD CONTEMPLATE TO TRIGGER SUCH A WAR. THE SALT I AGREEMENTS IN A SENSE CODIFIED THIS UNDERSTANDING. A SIMILAR UNDERSTANDING HAS DEVELOPED AS REGARDS THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ONE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR CAMPAIGN USING TACTICAL WEAPONS FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION LIVING AMONG THE MILITARY TARGETS WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THE EFFECTS OF A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ATTACK. MORE IMPORTANT TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE LEADING NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS WOULD BE THE FORMIDABLE RISK FOR AN ESCALATION TO A HIGHER LEVEL OF NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.

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THEREFORE, IT IS SO DISTURBING WHEN WE LEARN THAT ONGOING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MIGHT LEAD TO A NEW GENERATION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH YIELDS IN THE SUBKILOTON RANGE, OVERLAPPING THE YIELDS OF THE MOST POWERFUL CONVENTIONAL CHARGES, WITH EXTREME DELIVERY PRECISION, AND WITH EXTRA ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. THESE WEAPONS SYSTEMS ARE BY THEIR PROPONENTS SAID TO BE NOT ONLY USEABLE ON THE BATTLEFIELD BUT ALSO PREFERABLE

AS PROVIDING CHEAPER FIRE-POWER THAN CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS.

MOST IMPORTANT IS, HOWEVER, THAT AN INTRODUCTION OF SUCH MINI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BLUR THE PRESENT DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE ARE STRONGLY OF THE VIEW THAT AN ABSOLUTE "FIREBREAK" MUST BE KEPT UP

BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WAR.

OBSVIOUSLY, THE INTRODUCTION OF MINI-NUKES AND A DECLINE OF THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD WOULD CREATE ENORMOUS PROLIFERATION RISKS. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE NPT--TO REDUCE RISKS FOR NUCLEAR WAR--WOULD BE COUNTERED. THIS WOULD OCCUR AT A TIME WHEN IN MANY COUNTRIES A GROWING NUCLEAR INDUSTRY WILL PRODUCE CONSIDERABLE STOCKPILES OF EXCESS PLUTONIUM. MILITARY ARGUMENTS FOR ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAY AGAIN COME TO MAKE THEMSELVES HEARD, ALBEIT WITH DIFFERENT STRENGTH FROM NATION TO NATION.

WITHOUT ANY DOUBT, SUCH A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN REGARD TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD AFFECT THE VERY PREMISES ON WHICH ADHERENCE TO THE NPT IS BASED. IN THE VIEW OF THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS IT IS THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR THREAT, RATHER THAN THE ONE PERTAINING TO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THAT TODAY CAUSES ANXIETY ON THEIR PART. IT IS THE OPTION TO PRODUCE ORDINARY AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IF ONLY OF THE "OLD-FASHIONED" HIROSHIMA-SIZE, WHICH IS PRIMARILY "SACRIFICED" BY ADHERING TO THE NPT.

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 AEC-11 AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-11

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THERE ARE ENORMOUS RISKS INVOLVED IN UNSETTLING THE STATUS QUO BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS BY INTRODUCING CHANGES IN THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES. IF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS WERE TO ENTER UPON A NEW RACE TO "IMPROVE THE USEFULNESS" OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW SITUATION WOULD BE DEVELOPING ABOVE OUR HEADS. IT WOULD AFFECT POSSIBLE WAR THEATERS AROUND THE GLOBE, AND COULD CERTAINLY NOT BE RESTRICTED TO SCENARIOS FOR POSSIBLE CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS THEMSELVES.

FORTUNATELY, RESPONSIBLE STATESMEN IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES HAVE EXPRESSED THEMSELVES IN FAVOUR OF A CONTAINED HIGH NUCLEAR THRESHOLD AND OF REGARDING ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM CONVENTIONAL ONES.

AS IT WOULD TAKE A MUCH SHORTER TIME TO CHANGE THE DOCTRINES FOR THE USE OF THESE NEW SYSTEMS THAN TO DEVELOP AND PROCURE THEM, MY DELEGATION CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL THAT UNCLASSIFIED

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF MINI-NUKES IS STOPPED NOW.

THIS IS SUCH A SERIOUS MATTER THAT I MUST IMPLORE THE DELEGATIONS OF NUCLEAR POWERS AND MOST DIRECTLY OUR TWO CO-CHAIRMEN TO REPLY RAPIDLY AND FULLY TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:

1) IS IT TRUE THAT A NEW GENERATION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR PRECISION WEAPONS WITH SUBKILOTON YIELDS ARE BEING DEVELOPED AND TESTED?

2) ARE PLANS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS A REASON FOR FURTHER TESTING AND THUS AN OBSTACLE TO THE CONCLUSION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST-BAN?

3) IS IT TRUE THAT PREPARATIONS ARE MADE FOR THE EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS?

4) DOES THE RECENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN USA AND USSR ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR REFER ALSO TO WARS WHERE NO

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED EXCEPT SUCH MINI-NUKES?

5) DOES THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 255 (1968) IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN REFER ALSO TO NUCLEAR AGGRESSION IN WHICH NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED EXCEPT SUCH MINI-NUKES?

COMPLETE CLARITY ON THESE POINTS OF MAJOR CONCERN MUST BE GIVEN. I SINCERELY HOPE THAT THE ANSWERS CAN BE SO REASSURING THAT NO STATE PARTY TO THE NPT WILL INTERPRET THE SITUATION AS SUCH AN EXTRAORDINARY EVENT WHICH HAS "JEOPARDIZED THE SUPREME INTERESTS OF ITS COUNTRY", AND ACT ACCORDINGLY. THIS IS, OF COURSE, QUOTING THE WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE OF THE NPT. ON THE CONTRARY, I HOPE THAT THE ANSWERS WILL REMOVE ALL FEARS. EFFORTS MUST BE ENCOURAGED TO STOP A THREATENING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARMS RACE BY MEANS OF APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS HERE IN THIS COMMITTEE, AT SALT II, AND AT THE 1975 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, WHEN AMENDMENTS COULD TAKE CARE OF DIM OR DISPUTED POINTS. END TEXT EXCERPT

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